Independent Adoption: In Whose Best Interest?
In the last two years, this nation has witnessed the stirring conclusions to two highly-contested adoption cases.' On August 2,
1993, the birth parents of two-and-a-half-year old "BabyJessica" removed the tearful child from the home of the people she had
come to know as her parents. Likewise, on April 30, 1995, the
estranged birth parents of four-year-old "Baby Richard" took the
distraught child from the only home he had ever known.' The
"BabyJessica" case 4 and the "Baby Richard" case' are two well-publicized contested adoptions that have catapulted the current state
of adoption law into the public eye. 6 The public asks how and why
this could have happened to these innocent children, while adoptive parents live in fear of the proverbial "knock at the door."7
More than 100,000 adoptions are granted in this country every
year. 8 These adoptions occur in essentially two forms: agency
1 In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992) and In re Petition of Doe to Adopt
Baby BoyJanikova, 638 N.E.2d 181 (I.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994).
2 Deborah L. Forman, Unwed Fathers and Adoption: A TheoreticalAnalysis in Context,
72 TEX. L. REv. 967, 967 (1994) (observing that the nation "watched transfixed as
(Baby Jessica] was dragged sobbing, from the arms of her prospective adoptive
mother"); Kristen Korn, The Strugglefor the Child: Preservingthe Family in Adoption Disputes Between Biological Parents and Third Parties, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1279, 1279 (1994)
(noting that most of this country watched on August 2, 1993 as BabyJessica was taken
away "from the only parents she had ever known"). See also Mark Hansen, Fears of the
Heart,ABAJ., Nov. 1994, at 58 (taking note of three of the most publicized adoption
cases, involving Baby Jessica, Baby Richard, and Baby Emily).
3 Alex Rodriguez, Traumatic Day Tries Neighbor's Emotions, CHm. SUN TIMES, May 1,
1995, at 1.
4 B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 239.
5 Janikova, 638 N.E.2d at 181.
6 Korn, supra note 2, at 1280 (referring to the media attention given to these
disputes between birth parents and third parties); see also Elizabeth Bartholet, What's
Wrong with Adoption Law?, 30 TRIAL 19, 19 (1994) (observing that the BabyJessica case
"focused attention on problems with U.S. adoption laws").
7 Korn, supranote 2, at 1280 (explaining that media accounts of disputes between
birth parents and adoptive parents "have struck fear into the hearts of adoptive parents who are now afraid of losing their children to biological parents"); Bartholet,
supra note 6, at 19 (commenting that the public reaction to these contested adoption
cases "indicates a widespread sense that something very wrong is happening" and that
"[plopular sympathy is with the parents who have invested years of nurturing over
those whose claims are based on biology").
8 Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Adoption Law, 3 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 43, 44 (1993).
There may be as many as 150,000 to 160,000 adoptions granted each year. Id.
These adoptions are governed by international, federal, and state law. Id. at 45
(noting that adoption is complicated by the number of governments that have the
authority for regulation, by the number of federal statutes, and by constitutional principles). Aside from each state's laws on adoption, the Indian Child Welfare Act, fed-
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adoption 9 and independent adoption." For better or for worse,
the traditional method of agency adoption appears to be giving
way to the more controversial independent adoption."
AGENCY ADOPTION

In New Jersey, adoption agencies are nonprofit organizations,
approved and regulated by the Department of Human Services. 2
State statute governs the standards by which these agencies select
adoptive parents.' 3 The law specifically prohibits discrimination
against prospective parents on the basis of gender, race, national
origin, age, religion, or marital status. 4 The law provides, howeral immigration and naturalization laws, the federal Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare acts, federal welfare, Social Security laws, tax laws, and United States Supreme
Court rulings all affect adoptions. Id. at 45-46; see, e.g., In re Adoption of a Child of
Indian Heritage, 111 N.J. 155, 166 (1988) (considering the applicability of the Indian
Child Welfare Act). The existing state adoption laws are not uniform and are not
uniformly applied by courts, lawyers, or child welfare agencies. Hollinger, supra, at
45. When children are brought from one state to another, the parties "must also
comply with the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children." Mark T. McDermott, Agency Versus Independent Adoption: The Casefor Independent Adoption, 3 THE FuTURE OF CHILDREN 146, 148 (1993).
Due to the plethora and complexity of the laws governing adoption, many efforts
have been made to achieve uniformity. Hollinger, supra, at 46. These efforts include
the Uniform Adoption Act, the Uniform Parentage Act, the Interstate Compact on
the Placement of Children, the Model Act for the Adoption of Children with Special
Needs, and the Convention on Intercountry Adoption. Id.
9 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-39.1 (West 1993) (directing that approved agencies may
place, offer to place, and "materially assist in the placement of" children for adoption
in NewJersey). In an agency adoption, birth parents surrender their child and relinquish all parental rights to an adoption agency. McDermott, supra note 8, at 146.
10 McDermott, supra note 8, at 146. In an independent adoption, birth parents surrender their child and relinquish their parental rights to the prospective adoptive
parents. Id. Independent adoption includes intrafamily adoption and international
adoption. Hollinger, supra note 8, at 44, 45 (stating that "[h]alf or more of all adoptions are by stepparents or other relatives"). The intrafamily adoption is the least
regulated of all adoptions. Id. at 44. The number of adoptions of children born
outside the United States by American citizens is increasing rapidly. Id. at 45; see
generallyJorge L. Carro, Regulation of Intercountry Adoption: Can the Abuses Come to an
End , 9 AM. J. F~Ami. L. 135 (1995) and Margaret Liu, InternationalAdoptions: An Overview, 8 TEMP. Ir'L & COMP. L.J. 187 (1994).
11 McDermott, supra note 8, at 146.
12 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-38(a) (West 1993) (defining an approved agency as "a nonprofit corporation, association or agency, including any public agency, approved by
the Department of Human Services for the purpose of placing children for
adoption").
13 Id. at § 9:3-40.
14 Id. The Supreme Court of NewJersey has held that adoption agencies may not
require prospective adoptive parents to hold membership in an established religion.
In reAdoption of "E", 59 N.J. 36, 51, 279 A.2d 785, 793 (1971). Such a requirement
would violate New Jersey case law, state statute, and the First Amendment of the
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ever, that an agency may consider these factors to determine
whether a particular placement serves a child's best interests.1 5 Because the demand for healthy, adoptable infants is significantly
greater than the supply,' 6 agencies are able to establish demanding
criteria for prospective parents. 1 7 In effect, the agencies may discriminate in the name of the child's best interests.1 8
Aside from the rigid and discriminating criteria, agency adoptions are also criticized for the lengthy process and great expense.' 9 It can take longer than six years2" and more than $20,000
to adopt a child through an agency. 2 ' The irrevocable surrender
and permanent termination of parental rights provided by agency
United States Constitution. Id. In Adoption of "E",the court held that the prospective
adoptive parents' lack of belief in a "Supreme Being" was not grounds for denial of
the adoption. Id. at 50, 279 A.2d at 792. The court explained that, although there
may be an inquiry into the moral fitness of the prospective parents, religious belief or
lack thereof cannot be controlling. Id.
15 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-40 (West 1993). Agencies are permitted to match adoptive
parents and children based on common religious beliefs and may establish priorities
regarding racial background and ethnic and cultural heritage. Hollinger, supra note
8, at 48.
16 Lisa J. Trembly, Untangling the Adoption Web: New Jersey's Move to Legitimize Independent Adoptions, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 371, 371-72 (1993). The number of
healthy adoptable infants has decreased due, at least in part, to the availability of
contraceptives, the legalization of abortion, and societal acceptance of single
mothers. Id. at 372; see also Hollinger, supra note 8, at 44 .(stating that fewer babies
born out of wedlock are relinquished for adoption).
17 McDermott, supra note 8, at 147.
18 Id. (observing that the standards imposed on prospective parents by agencies
are sometimes arbitrary and have no relationship to the ability to be adequate parents). Some adoption agencies use age, religious preference, and residence as qualifications for prospective parents. Id.; see also Trembly, supra note 16, at 372 (noting the
shortage of infants and the rigid criteria used by agencies). Agencies also consider
marital status and whether the prospective parents already have a child. Trembly,
supra note 16, at 372. The criteria used by these agencies do not necessarily predict
who will be competent parents. Id. at 372-73. The child's age, medical history, and
social history have been found to be the most important factors in successful placements, not the ethnic, racial, or religious characteristics of the parents. Hollinger,
supra note 8, at 48-49, The imposition of the rigid criteria often harms the children
by delaying placement for so long that the children risk being deprived of permanent
placement. Id. at 48.
19 See infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
20 Trembly, supra note 16, at 373 (explaining that waiting periods for agency adoptions range from three to six years); see also McDermott, supra note 8, at 147 (observing that long waiting periods are typical with agency adoptions).
Other sources
indicate that the waiting period can last from two to 10 years. Trembly, supranote 16,
at 397 (citing NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR ADOPTION, ADOPTION FACTBOOK, UNITED
STATES DATA, ISSUES, REGULATION AND RESOURCES

6, 175 (1989)).

Trembly, supra note 16, at 373. Some sources declare that agency adoptions can
cost $30,000 or more. Id. at 373 n.11 (citing Diane Guernsey, Adoption: The Chosen
Child, TOWN & COUNTRY, May 1993, at 96).
21
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adoption, however, greatly outweighs these disadvantages. 2 2
There can be no adoption, agency or otherwise, without a
valid termination of the biological parents' rights.23 Parental
24
rights, though, are fundamental, constitutionally-protected rights
and cannot be severed without due process. 25 A NewJersey statute
clearly articulates the steps an agency must take to permanently
terminate those parental rights. 2 61 When those steps are followed
correctly, the birth parents' rights are permanently terminated.2 7
In contrast, the termination of parental rights in independent
adoption demands greater scrutiny by the court 28 and entails
22 Compare In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 245 (Iowa 1992) and In re Petition to
Adopt Baby BoyJanikova, 638 N.E.2d 181,183 (111.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994)
(independent adoption cases where the court ordered the return of children to birth
parents whose rights could not be terminated) with Lavigne v. Family and Children's
Soc'y, 11 N.J. 473, 482, 95 A.2d 6, 11 (1953) (agency adoption case where the court
found that the surrender of the child to the agency was irrevokable and refused to
return the child to the birth parents).
28 In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 428, 537 A.2d 1227, 1243 (1988) (citing In reAdoption of Children by D., 61 N.J. 89, 95, 293 A.2d 171, 173-74 (1972)).
24 In reAdoption of a Child by D.M.H., 135 N.J. 473, 480, 641 A.2d 235, 238, cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 43 (1994) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)); In re
Adoption of Children by LA.S., 134 N.J. 127, 132, 631 A.2d 928, 930 (1993) (recognizing that parental rights are surrounded by extraordinarily strong protections and
that "[t]he right of a biological parent to enjoy a relationship with his or her child is
fundamental and constitutionally protected"); New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family
Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 599, 512 A.2d 438, 442 (1986) (citing Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)) (observing that parental rights have been found to be fundamental, constitutionally protected, essential, basic rights, and more precious than
property rights).
25 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982). The Santosky Court addressed
the evidentiary standard for cases concerning the termination of parental rights. Id.
The Court held that a state must "support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence," id. at 748, before a parent's rights may be completely and irrevokably
severed. Id. at 747.
26 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41 (a) (West 1993).
27 Id. (directing that the surrender of parental rights is irrevocable).
28 Id. § 9:3-48(a). Because children are surrendered from one private party to another, NewJersey state statute directs that the court receiving the complaint for adoption shall
[d]eclare the child to be a ward of the court... [aippoint an approved
agency to make an investigation and submit a written report to the
court which shall include: ...the facts and circumstances surrounding
the surrender of custody by the child's parents ...an evaluation of the
child and the [prospective adoptive parents] and any other person residing in the prospective home; and.., any fees, expenses or costs paid
by or on behalf of the adopting parent in connection with the adoption.
Id. Further, the agency
shall, if it is able to, contact the birth parent and confirm that counseling... has either been provided or waived by the birth parent. If not
previously provided, the agency shall advise the parent of the availability
of such counseling through the agency and shall provide such counsel-
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greater risk for the prospective adoptive parents.29
In an agency adoption, the biological parent must execute a
"surrender" instrument.3 0 The surrender cannot be obtained until
seventy-two hours after the birth of the child." Prior to the signing
of the surrender instrument, the agency must inform the parents
that the instrument is a surrender of parental rights, manifesting
the permanent end of the parent/child relationship.12 The agency
must also offer counseling to the parents prior to the execution of
the surrender.3 3 When these steps have been followed, the surrender of parental rights is deemed "irrevocable." 4 In the absence of
fraud, duress, or misrepresentation, the parental rights are permanently terminated and the adoption may proceed.35 With these
safeguards in place, the inherent risks of adoption, such as losing a
ing if requested.... The agency shall further confirm that the birth
parent has been advised that the decision of the birth parent not to
place the child for adoption or the return of the child to the birth parent can not be conditioned upon the repayment of expenses by the
birth parent to the adoptive parent.
Id. The cost of this investigation is borne by the prospective adoptive parents. Id.
29 McDermott, supra note 8, at 148 (explaining the emotional and financial risks of
independent adoption). If a birth parent objects to the adoption, the court may deny
the adoption and return custody of the child to the birth parents. See, e.g., Sees v.
Baber, 74 N.J. 201, 226, 377 A.2d 628, 641 (1977). See also infra note 77 (discussing
the financial risks of independent adoption).
30 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41(a) (West 1993) (directing that the "[s]urrender of a
child to an approved agency for the purpose of adoption . . . shall be by a signed
instrument").
31 Id. § 9:3-41(e) (explaining that "[a] surrender of a child shall not be valid if
taken prior to the birth of the child... [or] . . . if taken within 72 hours of the birth
of the child"). The statute also explains that a denial of paternity at any time, including prior to birth, is deemed a surrender for the purpose of adoption of the child. Id.
32 Id. § 9:3-41(a). The agency is instructed to "inform the person executing the
surrender that the instrument is a surrender of parental rights by the signatory and
means the permanent end of the relationship and all contact between the parent and
child." Id.
33 Id. The statute directs that the surrender is valid and binding, regardless of "the
age of the person executing the surrender and shall be irrevocable except at the discretion of the approved agency taking such surrender or upon order or judgment of a
court of competent jurisdiction setting aside such surrender upon proof of fraud,
duress or misrepresentation by the approved agency." Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. The adoptive parent(s) must file a complaint for adoption with the court
after the child has been in the home for at least six months. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:347(a) (West 1993). The prospective parent(s) may file the complaint before the end
of the six-month period, at which time the court may schedule and hold an in-camera
"hearing to resolve all matters except finalization of the adoption." Id. §9:3-47(a) and
(c). The adoption agency must file a written report with the court, describing the
surrender of the child and evaluating the prospective parent(s), the child, and any
other person who resides in the prospective home. Id. §9:3-47(b). If the court finds
that the best interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption, based upon the
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child because a birth parent changes his or her mind, are
minimized. 6
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has long recognized the
value of the irrevocable surrender of parental rights in agency
38
adoptions. 7 In Lavigne v. Family and Children's Society of Elizabeth,
a married couple surrendered their child to an agency and executed a valid surrender instrument with full knowledge of its effect. 39 Nine months after the surrender, the father contacted the

agency seeking the return of the child.4" The agency advised the
father that the surrender was irrevocable.4" The Supreme Court of
New Jersey determined that the surrender was indeed irrevocable.4 2 The court instructed that requiring a surrender to be irrevocable "embodies a sound public policy."4 3 If adoption agencies are
to function, the court reasoned, agencies must be permitted to
plan for children without interference.'
agency's report and evidence presented at the hearing, the court will enter a judgment of adoption. Id. §9:3-47(d).
36 OSee, e.g., L. Jean Emery, Agency Versus Independent Adoption: The Case for Agency

Adoption, 3 THE FuTURE OF CHILDREN 139, 141 (1993) (emphasizing the importance of
the comprehensive services that adoption agencies provide to birth parents, who are
struggling "with the question of whether to relinquish their child for adoption," such
as: (1) informing birth parents of available resources and helping them obtain these
services; (2) providing birth parents "with a clear statement regarding their legal
rights, obligations, and responsibilities"; (3) supporting birth parents when they consider "what their decision will mean to them and to their child"; (4) assisting "in
transferring parental rights to the agency"; (5) completing the termination of parental rights; (6) assisting in separating birth parents from the child; and (7) assisting
birth parents "in coping with their emotional conflicts and grief").
37 See, e.g., Lavigne v. Family and Children's Soc'y, 11 N.J. 473, 482, 95 A.2d 6, 11
(1953).
38 Id.

39 Id. at 476-77, 95 A.2d at 7-8. The parents originally surrendered the child, at the
age of seven months, to the defendant for temporary placement in a foster home
because the father was suffering severe emotional disturbances, attributed in part to
the child. Id. at 475-76, 95 A.2d at 7. Seven months later, the child was returned to
the parents because the foster parents were no longer able to care for the child. Id. at
476, 95 A.2d at 8. Two months later, the parents again surrendered the child to the
defendant and executed a formal surrender and consent to the child's adoption. Id.
at 476-77, 95 A.2d at 8. The court found that the parents fully understood the effect
of signing the surrender. Id. at 477, 95 A.2d at 8.
40 Id. at 478, 95 A.2d at 8.
41 Id. The Superior Court, Chancery Division, granted the plaintiffs' request for
the return of the child. Id. at 475, 95 A.2d at 7. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the decision of the lower court. Id. The defendant petitioned the appellate division for a rehearing or for remand for additional testimony, but the
motion was denied. Id. The defendant petitioned the Supreme Court of New Jersey
for certification, which was granted. Id.
42 Lavigne, 11 N.J. at 482, 95 A.2d at 11.
43 Id. at 481-82, 95 A.2d at 10-11.
44 Id. at 482, 95 A.2d at 11.
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The Lavigne court verbalized an opinion that has recently
been the center of great debate, litigation, and legislation.4 5 The
court commented that adoption agencies benefit society because
they are unselfish, experienced, nonprofit associations. 46 In contrast, the court stressed, independent adoptions are detrimental to
society because they involve private, inexperienced individuals with
personal motives that do not include the best interests of the
child.4 7
INDEPENDENT ADOPTION

Independent adoption is by no means a new method of adoption, having been used as early as the 1930s." It is only in recent
years, however, that the number of independent adoptions has exceeded agency adoptions. 9 Independent adoptions take two
forms: direct placement and private placement.5 0 Direct placement occurs when the birth parents and the prospective adoptive
parents arrange the adoption without the assistance of a third
party.5 Private placement occurs when a third party, referred to as
an intermediary, introduces the birth parents to the prospective
adoptive parents.

5

1

45 See, e.g., Hansen, supranote 2, at 58 (listing the recent, well-publicized contested
adoption cases, each one an independent adoption); Korn, supra note 2, at 1279-80
(observing that the rash of contested independent adoptions has generated debate
among sociologists and legal scholars regarding the rights of birth parents, third parties, and the welfare of the child); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-39.1 (West 1993) (approving
the use of intermediaries in independent adoptions, thus legalizing private placement
adoption and making independent adoption more available).
46 Lavigne, 11 N.J. at 482, 95 A.2d at 11.
47 Id. Numerous other courts have voiced similar opinions about private adoption.
See, e.g., Sees v. Baber, 74 N.J. 201, 216-17, 377 A.2d 628, 636 (1977) (holding that the
decision to return the child to the birth mother was supported by the fact that "the
adoption was attempted through an unsupervised and unregulated private placement"). The Sees court expressed further support for agency adoptions, explaining
that "agency adoptions are designed to protect natural parents from precipitous decisions. They serve as well the interests of adoptive parents and the welfare of the
child." Id. at 217, 377 A.2d at 636, (citing State v. Wasserman, 75 N.J. Super. 480, 489,
183 A.2d 467, 472 (App. Div. 1962), affd., 39 N.J. 516, 189 A.2d 218 (1963)). The
Supreme Court of New Jersey continues to express this opinion regarding private
adoptions. In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 422, 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (1988) (citing Sees,
74 N.J. at 217, 377 A.2d at 636)). In the infamous Baby M case, the court explained
that although private placement adoption is permitted in New Jersey, it is very much
disfavored. Id.
48 McDermott, supra note 8, at 146.
49 Id.
50 Trembly, supra note 16, at 378.
51 Id.

52

Id.
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Until 1994,,NewJersey prohibited the use of intermediaries in
adoption.5" Prior to 1994, therefore, direct placement was the only
form of independent adoption permitted in New Jersey.5 4 The
Legislature, however, recently amended the adoption statute and
provided for the use of intermediaries, thus legalizing private
placement adoption.5 5
On a national level, there has been an increase in independent adoptions.5 6 Experts cite a variety of reasons for this increase.
First, with an agency adoption, birth parents are typically not involved in the selection of adoptive parents.5 8 Some birth parents
are more comfortable surrendering a child for adoption when they
have personally selected the adoptive parents. 59 Independent
adoption makes this possible, and the contact between the birth
parents and adoptive parents can also result in a more "open"
adoption.60
53 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-39 (West 1977) (repealed 1993) (prohibiting any "person,
firm, partnership, corporation, association or agency" from placing or materially assisting "in the placement of any child for adoption in New Jersey unless such person
shall be the parent or guardian of the child, or such firm, partnership, corporation,
association or agency shall be an approved agency").
54 Id.
55 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-39.1 (West 1993) (permitting intermediaries to place, offer
to place, and materially assist in placing children for adoption). An "intermediary" is
defined as "any person, firm, partnership, corporation, association or agency, who
acts for or between any parent and any prospective parent or acts on behalf of either
in connection with a placement for adoption of the parent's child." Id. § 9:3-38(1).
Intermediaries may "not receive money or other valuable consideration in connection
with the placement of a child for adoption." Id. Any "person, firm, partnership, corporation, association, intermediary or agency other than an approved agency which
pays, seeks to pay, receives, or seeks to receive money or other valuable consideration
in connection with the placement of a child for adoption shall be guilty of a crime of
the second degree." Id. § 9:3-39.1(d).
56 McDermott, supra note 8, at 146 (stating that "more newborns are placed each
year through independent adoption than through private agency adoption" in this
country).
57 See infra notes 58-68 and accompanying text.
58 McDermott, supra note 8, at 147; Trembly, supra note 16, at 399.
59 McDermott, supra note 8, at 147 (stating that one explanation birth parents
offer for their preference of independent adoption is the "desire to play an active role
in the selection of the adoptive parents").
60 Id. (noting that the openness of independent adoptions provides many benefits,
such as psychological benefits to the birth parents, the adoptive parents, and the
child). Specifically, birth parents better cope with their feelings of loss when they
have met the adoptive parents. Id. at 148. The child benefits by receiving answers to
questions about origin and may not suffer the void that interferes with identity formation. Id. The adoptive parents benefit by lessened fears of losing the child. Id.
A truly open adoption is one in which the adoptive parents agree "to allow a
birthparent or another relative to maintain contact with a child after an adoption is
final." Hollinger, supranote 8, at 50. See also id. at 50-51 (discussing open adoptions).
The applicable New Jersey statute provides that
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Second, in an agency adoption, the child is.often placed in
temporary foster care while the birth parents! rights are terminated.61 In an independent adoption, the child can be placed with
the prospective adoptive parents immediately. 2 Many birth parents prefer to place an infant in his or her future home without
delay and without the risks of danger known to exist in foster
care. 63 Proponents of agency adoption argue, however, that there
is greater risk in placing a child in the prospective parents' home
without the type of approval an agency will first obtain.64
[a]ll records of proceedings relating to adoption, including the complaint, judgment and all petitions, affidavits, testimony, reports, briefs,
orders and other relevant documents, shall be filed under seal by the
clerk of the court and shall at no time be open to inspection or copying
unless the court, upon good cause shown, shall otherwise order.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-52 (West 1993). The result of this statute, and ones like it in
each state, is "a permanent veil of secrecy between adoptive and biological families."
Hollinger, supra note 8, at 51. See id. at 51-55 (discussing the benefits and detriments
of sealed adoption records and proposed solutions); see generally Jason Kuhns, The
Sealed Adoption Records Controversy: BreakingDown the Walls of Secrecy, 24 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 259 (1994) (reviewing the history of sealed adoption records, statutory
authority, constitutional challenges, changing views, and the need for reform).
61 Trembly, supra note 16, at 397; McDermott, supra note 8, at 148-49.
62 McDermott, supra note 8, at 147 (stating that birth parents prefer independent
adoption because the child can "go directly into the physical custody of the adoptive
parents rather than into temporary foster care"). In an independent adoption, the
prospective adoptive parents are commonly present at the hospital and may even be
in the birthing room during the birth. Id. at 150. The prospective adoptive parents
may also have access to the child between birth and release from the hospital. Id.
Further, the child is often discharged from the hospital directly to the prospective
adoptive parents. Id.
63 Trembly, supra note 16, at 399 (asserting that many parents have fears concerning the child's placement in foster care); see also Stacy Robinson, Remedying Our Foster
Care System: Recognizing Chidren's Voices, 27 FAM. L. Q. 395, 395 (1993) (stating that
"under the current foster care system, the state often fails to protect the child from
harm").
64 Emery, supra note 36, at 144 (explaining that children are often placed in the
prospective adoptive home before a home study is done).
Although the NewJersey Legislature made independent adoption more available
by approving private placement adoptions, the Legislature added a safeguard for the
children in such adoptions. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-39.1(a) (West 1993). The New
Jersey statute only allows the intermediary to place a child with a person approved for
placement "by an approved agency home study which consists of the agency's formal
written assessment of the capacity and readiness of the prospective adoptive parents
to adopt a child." Id. § 9:3-39.1 (a) (4).
Unfortunately, in direct placement adoptions, a home study is not necessarily
completed until some time after the child is received in the prospective adoptive parents' home. Id. § 9:3-48. The statute provides that when "a person receives a child
into his home for the purpose of adoption other than from an approved agency, a
complaint for adoption shall be filed within 45 days after receipt of the child." Id.
§ 9:3-44. When the court receives the complaint, the court shall appoint an approved
agency to make an evaluation of the child and of the prospective adoptive parents
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A third possible reason for the increase in independent adoptions is that prospective adoptive parents may provide financial
assistance to the birth parents. 65 In New Jersey, prospective parents may pay, provide, or reimburse birth parents for medical and
hospital expenses connected with the birth or illness of the child.6 6
In addition, the birth mother may receive reasonable living expenses, such as payment for food, clothing, and shelter.6 7 The statute also provides for payment of vocational, religious,
68
psychological, or similar counseling services.
The benefit of financial assistance is an additional source of
controversy 69 and a significant risk for the prospective parents.7"
New Jersey requires that a report to the court include fees and expenses paid by or on behalf of the adoptive parents with regard to
the adoption. 71 This purported safeguard may not be at all effective in prohibiting the buying and selling of children. 72 Excessive
fees will not be exposed until the child has been in the home of the
"and any other person residing in the prospective home." Id. § 9:3-48(a). Thus, a
child may live in a home for 45 days or longer before any home study is completed.
The prospective adoptive parents' "(f]ailure to file the complaint in a timely
manner shall not be a sole basis for refusal of the adoption but the failure shall require the filing, with the complaint, of an affidavit setting forth the reasons for the
delay." Id. § 9:3-44.
65 Hollinger, supranote 8, at 49 (observing that birth mothers prefer to deal with
those "who will pay for pregnancy and birth-related medical and living expenses").
66 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-39.1(e) (West 1993).
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Hollinger, supra note 8, at 49. All states "decry baby selling, and most prohibit
finder's fees to agencies or other intermediaries." Id.
70 See infra note 77 (explaining the financial risks of independent adoption).
71 N.J. STAT. ANNN. § 9:3-55 (West 1993). The statute directs that in every adoption, other than an intrafamily adoption, the prospective adoptive parents
shall file before the complaint is heard ... a detailed report which shall
be signed and verified by each prospective parent and shall disclose all
sums of money or other valuable consideration paid, given or agreed to
be given to any person, firm, partnership, corporation, association or
agency ... to whom the consideration was given or promised. The report... shall include but not be limited to expenses incurred or to be
incurred by or on behalf of a prospective parent in connection with (1)
The birth of the child; (2) The placement for adoption of the child with
the prospective parent; (3) Medical or hospital care received by the
mother or the child during the mother's pre- and postnatal period; and
(4) Services relating to the adoption or to the placement for adoption,
including legal services, which were rendered or are to be rendered to
or for the benefit of the prospective parent, either parent of the child
or any other person or agency.
Id.
72 See infra notes 7374 and accompanying text.
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prospective parents for several months.73 This excessive payment
may not be enough to invalidate the placement. If the court determines that the placement is otherwise in the best interests of the

child, the court may approve the adoption and leave punishment
to criminal or licensing authorities."

This practice will not deter

prospective parents from offering financial incentives to birth parents and will only encourage a market, open only to the affluent,

for adoptable infants.
Additionally, in any type of adoption, there is always the possibility that a birth parent will change his or her mind about surrendering the child.75 In an agency adoption, the prospective parents
will usually be spared most of the agency fees if a birth parent
changes his or her mind prior to the termination of parental

rights. 76 In an independent adoption, however, the birth parents
are under no obligation to reimburse the prospective parents for
any fees or expenses received.7 7 This may leave prospective par73 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-48 (West 1993) (directing that in an independent adoption, the preliminary hearing on the complaint is held "not less than two or more
than three months from the date of the filing of the complaint"). Given that prospective adoptive parents have 45 days to file the complaint and then at least two months
until the preliminary hearing date, the report detailing financial assistance may not
be received by the court for more than three months after the child is received.
In an independent adoption, the agency report to the court must also include
"any fees, expenses or costs paid by or on behalf of the adopting parent in connection
with the adoption." Id. § 9:3-48(a)(2)(c). The agency report must be filed ten days
prior to the date of the preliminary hearing. Id. § 9:3-48(a) (4). Again, financial disclosures will not be received by the court for as long as three months following the
surrender of the child due to the 45 days permitted for filing of the complaint and
the minimum two month wait for the preliminary hearing. See In re Adoption of a
Child by D.M.H., 135 N.J. 473, 489, 490, 641 A.2d 235, 242, 243 (1994) (noting that
the prospective adoptive parents did not file the complaint for adoption until 10
months after the surrender of the child and acknowledging that prospective adoptive
parents may or may not bring adoption actions within a reasonable time).
74 Hollinger, supra note 8, at 49 (explaining that "[u]pon finding that a proposed
adoption involves unlawful placement activities but is otherwise in the best interest of
a child, many courts will approve the adoption and will leave the punishment of the
unlawful activities to the criminal or licensing laws").
75 Trembly, supra note 16, at 403.
76 McDermott, supranote 8, at 148-49 (explaining that in an agency adoption, the
child is often placed in temporary foster care until the birth parents' rights have been
terminated and, thus, if the birth parents change their mind, the prospective adoptive
parents will not have to pay some, if not all, of the agency's fees).
77 Id. at 148 (stating that one of the financial risks of an independent adoption is
that prospective adoptive parents may have already paid attorney's fees and medical
expenses when the birth parents change their mind and will most likely not be reimbursed); Hollinger, supra note 8, at 49 (explaining that prospective adoptive parents
"assume the risk of not being reimbursed for expenses they have paid on behalf of a
birthparent who does not consent to an adoption or who revokes consent"); NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 9:3-48(a) (2) (c) (West 1993) (directing that in an independent adop-
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ents without the child they had hoped to adopt and without the
resources to begin the process again.7 8
Further, receiving substantial financial assistance may cause
the birth parents to feel obligated to continue with the adoption.7"
In In re Adoption of One Child by R.A. C.,1 0 the birth mother agreed to
an independent adoption prior to giving birth.81 The prospective
adoptive parents paid the birth mother's medical and hospital expenses.8 2 Following the child's birth, the birth mother became unhappy with the decision to surrender the child, but proceeded with
the surrender3 because she felt committed to the prospective adop8
tive parents.
If the birth mother in R.A.C. could feel too committed to
change her mind upon receipt of only the basic medical expenses,
certainly birth parents who receive payment for additional expenses, such as food, clothing, shelter, and counseling, will feel
even more obligated to follow through with an adoption. Unregulated financial assistance, therefore, creates serious problems. As
demonstrated by RA. C., birth parents may feel significant pressure
to surrender the child.8 4 Birth parents who proceed with a surrender due to feelings of obligation may subsequently object to the
adoption. Those objections can result in litigation that is financially and emotionally costly.8 5
The most significant disadvantage of independent adoption
involves the termination of parental rights. 86 The safeguards of an
tion, the court-appointed approved agency shall contact the birth parent and "confirm that the birth parent has been advised that the decision of the birth parent not to
place the child for adoption or the return of the child to the birth parent can not be
conditioned upon the repayment of expenses by the birth parent to the adoptive
parent").
78 McDermott, supra note 8, at 148 (noting that prospective adoptive parents "will
most likely not be reimbursed by the birthparents").
79 Emery, supra note 36, at 144 (explaining that the practice of payment for housing and medical services "creates a sense of obligation on the part of the birthparents
to the adoptive parents which may unfairly influence the birthparents' decision").
The longer the birth parents receive financial assistance from the prospective adoptive parents, the greater the pressure to surrender the child will become. Id. The
birth parents may not feel as though they are able to rethink their decision. Id.
80 154 NJ. Super. 513, 381 A.2d 1232 (App. Div. 1977), certif. denied, 75 NJ. 607,
384 A.2d 837 (1978).
81 Id. at 515, 381 A.2d at 1233.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 516, 381 A.2d at 1233.
84 Id.
85 See generally RA.C., 154 NJ. Super. 513, 381 A.2d 1232.
86 See supra note 22 (illustrating the importance of termination of parental rights
and the different outcome in contested adoption cases depending upon whether the
adoption was independent or through an agency).
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agency adoption-such as an experienced, disinterested agency
obtaining an informed surrender-are not present when a birth
parent surrenders a child directly to a prospective parent. 7 Thus,
the state must provide alternative safeguards to ensure that a parent's fundamental, constitutional right to enjoy a relationship with
his or her child is not severed without due process.a
When a child is properly surrendered to an adoption agency,
87 As the court in Lavigne v. Family and Children's Society observed, independent
adoptions are a disadvantage to society because they involve private, inexperienced
individuals with personal motives that do not include the best interests of the child.
Lavigne, 11 N.J. at 482, 95 A.2d at 11.
88 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-48 (West 1993). Upon receipt of the complaint for adoption, the court must "[d]eclare the child to be a ward of the court and declare that
the plaintiff shall have custody of the child subject to further order of the court." Id.
§ 9:3-48(a)(1). The court must
[a]ppoint an approved agency to make an investigation and submit a
written report to the court which shall include: (a) the facts and circumstances surrounding the surrender of custody by the child's parents
and the placement of the child in the home of the plaintiff; (b) an
evaluation of the child and of the plaintiff and the spouse of the plaintiff if not the child's parent and any other person residing in the prospective home; and (c) any fees, expenses or costs paid by or on behalf
of the adopting parent in connection with the adoption.
Id. § 9:3-48(a)(2).
The statute further provides that the agency shall contact the birth parent to
confirm that counseling was provided or waived and, if not provided, shall offer such
counseling. Id.
The court must set a date for a preliminary hearing for the purpose of determining "the circumstances under which the child was relinquished by his parents and
received into the home of the plaintiff, the status of the parental rights of the parents,
the fitness of the child for adoption and the fitness of the plaintiff to adopt the child
and to provide a suitable home." Id. § 9:3-48(b).
If, after the preliminary hearing, the court finds that the birth parents
do not have rights as to custody of the child by... their failure to make
timely objection to the adoption or their substantial failure to perform
the regular and expected parental functions of care and support of the
child, although able to do so, or their inability to perform these functions which is unlikely to change in the immediate future; ...the court
shall ... terminate the parental rights.
Id. § 9:3-48(c).
The process, however, is not complete at that time. The court must schedule a
final hearing date on the adoption complaint no sooner than six months from the
date of the preliminary hearing. Id. Further, the appointed adoption agency must
visit the prospective adoptive parents' home from time to time and make another
written report to the court at least 15 days prior to the final hearing. Id. § 9:3-48(d).
If the appointed agency recommends the adoption, the court may dispense with the
final hearing and enter a judgment of adoption immediately "if the court is satisfied
that the best interests of the child would be promoted by the adoption." Id. § 9:348(e). If the court proceeds with a final hearing and "the court is satisfied that the
best interests of the child would be promoted by the adoption, the court shall enter a
judgment of adoption." Id. § 9:3-48(0.
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the birth parents' rights are irrevocably terminated. 9 In an independent adoption, however, the court must make a legal finding
that the birth parents' rights should be terminated.9 ° In many
cases, the courts have refused to terminate parental rights.9 1
Lengthy court battles concerning the termination of these rights
are often waged between birth parents and prospective adoptive
parents.9 2 The often inevitable surrender of a child to virtual strangers begs the question: How can this process be in the best interests of the child?
The only available answer comes from reviewing the two-step
analysis a court makes when considering approving an independent adoption.9" The threshold issue for the court is whether the
birth parents' rights should be terminated.9 4 It is only after the
court terminates those parental rights that the court will consider
whether placement with the prospective adoptive parents is in the
child's best interests.9 5
89 See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (explaining that the valid surrender of a child to an adoption agency is "irrevocable").
90 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-48(c) (West 1993).
91 B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 246 (Iowa 1992); Janikova, 638 N.E.2d 181, 182 (111.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994).
92 See generally, B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 239; Janikova, 638 N.E.2d at 181.
93 See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
94 See, e.g., B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 245 (stating that statutory grounds for termination must be established before a determination concerning the best interests of the
child); Janikova, 638 N.E.2d at 182 (explaining that the father's parental rights could
not be terminated and that this precluded any consideration of the child's best
interests).
95 See, e.g., Janikova, 638 N.E.2d at 182 (articulating that the threshold issue is the
termination of parental rights and, if termination is appropriate, then the issue becomes what is in the child's best interests). But cf Sorentino v. Family & Children's
Soc'y of Elizabeth, 72 NJ. 127, 367 A.2d 1168 (1976) (Sorentino I) and Sorentino v.
Family & Children's Soc'y of Elizabeth, 74 NJ. 313, 378 A.2d 18 (1977) (Sorentino
II).
In Sorentino I, an adoption agency coerced a young birth mother to surrender her
child. Sorentino 1, 72 N.J. at 129, 367 A.2d at 1169. Three months later, the birth
parents attempted to regain custody of their child, but were denied by the agency. Id.
The birth parents sought legal advice, but were advised to delay legal action until the
mother reached the age of 18. Id. The birth parents eventually filed for custody, but
the child was in the care of the prospective adoptive parents for almost two years by
the time the case was argued before the Supreme Court of NewJersey. Id. at 130, 367
A.2d at 1169.
The supreme court noted its role as parens patriaeand its responsibility to preserve children from harm. Id. at 132, 367 A.2d at 1171. The court was willing to
consider the bonding between the child and prospective adoptive parents in spite of
the invalid surrender. Id. at 132-33, 367 A.2d at 1171. The case was remanded to the
chancery division for a ruling on custody, wherein the birth parents were to establish
that the risk of serious psycholigical harm would not become a reality. Id. at 133, 367
A.2d at 1171.
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In the Baby Jessica case, 96 the Supreme Court of Iowa determined the fate of an infant, originally surrendered for adoption
shortly after her birth.9 7 The birth parents, Cara and Scott, signed
releases of their parental rights and the court terminated those
rights.9 8 Later, Cara asserted that a man named Daniel was actually
the birth father.9 9 Daniel interceded in the adoption case to advance his parental rights.100 The district court determined that
Daniel was the baby's father. 0 1 Because Daniel had not released
his parental rights, the court ordered that the prospective adoptive
On remand, the chancery division granted custody to the prospective adoptive
parents. Sorentino 1I,
74 N.J. at 317, 378 A.2d at 20. In Sorentino 7,the Supreme Court
of NewJersey upheld the trial court's ruling and went on to consider the termination
of the birth parents' rights. Id. at 320, 321-26, 378 A.2d at 21-24. The court analyzed
the situation under the newly-enacted Adoption Act, which required a birth parent to
have forsaken his or her parental obligations before his or her rights could be terminated. Id. at 322, 378 A.2d at 22.
The court pushed aside the invalid surrender and focused instead upon the birth
parents' conduct. Id. at 324, 378 A.2d at 23. The court observed that, due to the
birth parents' delay in instituting an action for custody, no parent/child relationship
existed. Id. The court noted that a paramount concern underlying the Adoption Act
was the maintenance of the parent/child relationship. Id. This policy, the court reasoned, would not be defeated by terminating the birth parents' rights in this case
because no parent/child relationship existed. Id.
Importantly, the Sorentino II court distinguished the decision in Sees v. Baber. Id.
at 325, 378 A.2d at 24. The court emphasized that Sees involved an independent adoption and furthered two important policies of the Adoption Act. Id. at 326, 378 A.2d at
24. The court explained that Sees "furthers the policy of protecting the natural parent
from making a hurried or abrupt decision to give up the child, and it promotes the
policy of the Act to encourage adoptions made through approved agencies ... and to
discourage adoptions through private placments where the interests of adoptive parents are served at the expense of the interests of the child." Id.
96 In re B.C.G., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992).
97 Id. at 241. Cara signed a release of custody approximately 40 hours afte'r the
child's birth. Id. at 243. Iowa law provides that such a surrender shall not be signed
"less than seventy-two hours after the birth of the child." Id.
98 Id. at 240-41. The court terminated Cara and Scott's parental rights at a preliminary hearing and the prospective adoptive parents took custody of the child at that
time. Id. at 241.
99 Id. Cara later moved to set aside the termination of her parental rights in juvenile court. Id. She also asserted at that time that Daniel was the real father, and she
informed Daniel of that fact. Id. The juvenile court did not rule on Cara's motion
because the court determined that it did not have jurisdiction because the adoption
petition had been filed in the district court. Id. at 242. Cara appealed the juvenile
court's decision. Id. at 241. The court of appeals remanded the case to the juvenile
court for a ruling on Cara's motion and the prospective adoptive parent's claim that
Cara waived the 72-hour waiting period for surrender of parental rights. Id. at 244.
The district court granted further review of the court of appeals decision and upheld
that decision. Id. at 241, 244. The district court explained that it is possible for a
birth mother to waive the 72-hour waiting period. Id. at 243.
100 Id. at 241.
101 B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 241.
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parents surrender the baby to him.10 2 The- prospective adoptive
parents obtained a stay of the order transferring custody to Daniel
and appealed to the Supreme Court of Iowa.105
Understandably, the prospective adoptive parents argued that
10 4
the surrender would not be in the best interests of the child.
The supreme court explained in very certain terms, however, that
the best interests of the child are not grounds for determining
whether to terminate a birth parent's rights.' 0 5 Because the father's rights could not be terminated under Iowa state law, the
court ordered the prospective adoptive parents to return the child
10 6
to her birth father.
Similarly, in the Baby Richard case,10 7 the Supreme Court of
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 245. The court acknowledged that it is an alluring argument to insist that
the placement with the prospective adoptive parents is in the best interests of the
child. Id.
105 Id. The court explained that "statutory grounds for termination must be established .. " Id. The court emphasized that "parental rights may not be terminated
solely on consideration of the child's best interest. . . ." Id.
106 Id. at 241. The court concluded that the adoption proceedings were fatally
flawed because Daniel's parental rights were not, and could not be, terminated. Id. at
245.
The battle did not end with the supreme court's decision in September 1992.
The prospective adoptive parents petitioned for a stay of the Supreme Court of Iowa's
order. DeBoer v. DeBoer, 114 S.Ct. 11, 11 (1993). That petition was denied. Id.
The prospective adoptive parents began a new battle in the Michigan courts challenging the Supreme Court of Iowa's order denying the adoption and granting custody to
the birth parents. DeBoer v. Schmidt, 502 N.W.2d 649, 653-54 (Mich. 1993). The
Supreme Court of Michigan held that the Iowa judgment must be enforced and encouraged the adults to proceed with the transfer of custody promptly. Id. at 668.
Another petition was brought to Justice Stevens, as Circuit Justice for the Sixth Circuit, for a stay of the Supreme Court of Michigan's order. DeBoer v. DeBoer, 114 S.
Ct. 1, 1 (1993). Justice Stevens denied the request for a stay, reasoning that there was
"neither a reasonable probability that the Court [would] grant certiorari nor a fair
prospect that, if it did so, it would conclude that the decision below is erroneous...."
Id.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Iowa denying the adoption and transferring custody was made on September 23, 1992. B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 239. With
appeals, petitions for stays, requests for rehearings, and other proceedings, BabyJessica spent another year adjusting to a home with her prospective adoptive parents,
only to be surrendered to her birth parents, complete strangers, on August 2, 1993.
Korn, supra note 2, at 1279. Justice Stevens noted that the prospective adoptive parents "claim that Jessica's best interests will be served by allowing them to retain custody of her rests, in part, on the relationship that they have been able to develop with
the child after it became clear that they were not entitled to adopt her." DeBoer v.
DeBoer, 114 S.Ct. 1, 1-2 (1993).
107 In re Petition of Doe to Adopt Baby Boy Janikova, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill.), cert.
denied, 115 S.Ct. 499 (1994).
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Illinois reviewed the contested adoption of a three-year-old boy.108
The birth mother, Daniella, executed a consent to the child's
adoption four days after the child's birth.10 9 Daniella refused to
release the name of the child's father to the prospective adoptive
parents.110 Daniella later informed the birth father, Otakar, that
the child died shortly after birth.1 ' Fifty-seven days after the
child's birth, Otakar discovered that the child was alive."' Otakar
contested the pending adoption, but the trial court terminated his
parental rights." 3 The decision of the trial court was affirmed by
the court of appeals based upon the child's best interests." 4
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the lower
courts." 5 The court explained that the child's best interests can
only be considered after the birth parents' rights have been terminated. 1 6 At first glance, this result indicates a very cold, sterile application of a two-part test. On the contrary, the court recognized
the terrible circumstances of the case and pointed out that any
fault could be assigned to the birth mother and/or to the prospective adoptive parents.' 17 The court noted that the birth mother
108

Id. at 182.

109 Id. at 181.

Daniella began living with the birth father, Otakar, in the fall of
1989. Id. at 182. In June 1990, Daniella became pregnant. Id. Otakar supported
Daniella until the last month of her pregnancy. Id. During the last month of
Daniella's pregnancy, Otakar traveled to Czechoslovakia to be with his gravely-ill
grandmother. Id. While Otakar was there, Otakar's aunt called Daniella and advised
her "that Otakar had resumed a former romantic relationship with another woman."
Id. Daniella left her and Otakar's apartment, refused to speak with Otakar when he
returned from Czechoslovakia, gave birth to her son at a different hospital than previously arranged, and thereafter consented to the child's adoption. Id.
110 Id. Daniella indicated to the attorney for the prospective adoptive parents that
she knew the father's identity. Id. Daniella would not release his name and the attorney made no efforts to ascertain his name or address. Id.
Ill Id.
112 Janikova, 638 N.E.2d at 182.
113 Id. The trial court found "that Otakar was an unfit parent.. . because he had
not shown a reasonable degree of interest in the child within the first 30 days of his
life." Id. Based upon that finding, the trial court held that Otakar's consent to the
adoption was unnecessary. Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 183.
116 Id. at 182. The majority opinion is barely more than one page and emphasizes
that the threshold issue is not the best interests of the child. Id. The court also commented that Illinois adoption laws "are neither complex nor difficult of application."
Id. Particularly, the court took note of the law that places "the burden of proof on the
adoptive parents in establishing.. . the relinquishment and/or unfitness of the natural parents," id., and the law that demands "a good-faith effort to notify the natural
parents of the adoption proceedings." Id.
117 Janikova, 638 N.E.2d at 182. The court stressed how unfortunate it was that the
child involved was only three years old. Id.
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deceitfully tried to deprive the birth father of his parental rights.1 18
In addition, the court observed that the prospective adoptive parents failed to make the required good-faith effort to notify the
birth father and should have relinquished custody of the baby
when the birth father asserted his parental rights. 19
While contested adoption cases in NewJersey have not been as
publicized or notorious as the Baby Jessica and the Baby Richard
cases, the New Jersey courts have considered similar issues and
have reached similar results. 120 - As early as 1910, the New Jersey
courts applied the two-part test governing approval of independent
adoptions.1 2 1 In Wood v. Wood,12 2 the Court of Errors and Appeals
considered a contested adoption and found that the birth mother's
actions constituted abandonment of her child. 1 23 The court ruled
that such abandonment was an appropriate basis for terminating
the mother's parental rights. 124 The court, after determining that
the placement was in the best interests of the child, approved the
25
adoption.1
Id.
Id.
120 See infra notes 122-186 and accompanying text (discussing the NewJersey cases
that have applied the same two-part test that was utilized in the BabyJessica and Baby
Richard cases).
121 Wood v. Wood, 77 N.J. Eq. 593, 597, 77 A. 91, 93-94 (E. & A. 1910).
122 77 N.J. Eq. 593, 77 A. 91 (E. & A. 1910). The plaintiff sought to adopt her niece,
Loretta. Id. at 593, 77 A. at 92. When Loretta was six years old, her father brought
her to his two sisters and asked that they "take her and bring her up and have her
educated." Id. at 594, 77 A. at 92. The father explained that Loretta's mother would
not look after Loretta properly. Id. Thereafter, Loretta lived with her two aunts and
occasionally visited her parents, who made no objection to this arrangement until
Loretta was 12 years old. Id. Loretta's father had since died and Loretta's mother
wanted Loretta to come back because her other children "had had to 'rough it,'
[and] she thought Loretta ought to do the same." Id. at 594, 595, 77 A. at 92. The
aunts did not want to return Loretta to her mother. Id. at 595, 77 A. at 92. Loretta's
mother went to Loretta's school, "took her and compelled her to go with her." Id., 77
A. at 93. Loretta's mother then explained that she wanted Loretta to be raised as a
Catholic, not Presbyterian as her aunts had chosen. Id. at 595, 596-97, 77 A. 93.
123 Id. at 597, 77 A. at 93-94. The court explained that the mother's course of conduct indicated "that there was a settled intention to forego parental rights and to
leave the child permanently in the care of her aunts, for the reason that it was considered by both parents to be for the child's good." Id. The court stated that Loretta's
mother should not be permitted to reassert her parental rights to the detriment of
the child. Id., 77 A. at 94.
124 Id. at 598, 77 A. at 94. The court concluded that the mother's conduct
amounted to an abandonment under the adoption statute. Id.
125 Id. at 597, 598, 77 A. at 93. The court examined the care provided by the aunts
as well as the character of the aunt seeking adoption. Id. at 596, 597, 77 A. at 93. The
court found that Loretta had been happy and content with the aunts and that the
aunts had always provided for her. Id. at 596, 77 A. at 93. The court also noted that
the aunts are "people of truthfulness and of unusual refinement and cultivation for
118

119
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Following the guidance of cases like Wood v. Wood, 12 6 the
127
Supreme Court of New Jersey in In re Adoption of Children by D.
reversed a judgment of adoption.1 28 The trial court granted the
adoption, reasoning that it was in the children's best interests.12 9
On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey emphasized the necessity of a preliminary determination that the rights of a birth parent can and should be terminated prior to a decision concerning a
child's best interests.13 0 The court found that the birth father had
not forsaken his parental obligations and, therefore, his rights
could not be terminated and the adoption could not proceed. 3 1
their station in life, and no doubt are as fond of Loretta as they could be if she were
their own child." Id.
126 See also Ziezel v. Hutchinson, 91 N.J. Eq. 325, 326, 328, 109 A. 300, 300, 301 (E.
& A. 1920) (awarding custody to the birth father because there was no legal consent
to adoption and no proof of parental unfitness).
127 61 N.J. 89, 293 A.2d 171 (1972). The case involved the contested adoption of
two children by their stepfather. Id. at 92, 293 A.2d at 172. In unreported opinions,
the trial court granted the adoption and the appellate division affirmed the trial
court's decision. Id. at 91, 293 A.2d at 173. The birth father "had been found guilty
of several juvenile and criminal offenses," id. at 96, 293 A.2d at 174, occurring prior to
and after his marriage to the birth mother. Id. The later offenses were the result of a
narcotics addiction. Id. The birth father was incarcerated several times, including a
three-year period of incarceration. Id. His father or the birth mother brought the
children to visit him during this three-year incarceration. Id. The birth mother and
birth father became divorced while the birth father was incarcerated. Id. Upon his
release, the birth father visited the children every week; the children were "willing
and eager to see him." Id.
128 Id. at 99, 293 A.2d at 176.
129 Id. at 97, 293 A.2d at 175.
130 Id. at 95, 293 A.2d at 174. The court first emphasized the importance and
strength of the parent-child relationship. Id. at 93, 293 A.2d at 173. The court stated
that a "child's relationship with the parent is of such significance that all doubts are to
be resolved against its destruction." Id. The court also stressed that the rationale of
the New Jersey cases is that "the best interests of the child cannot validly ground a
judgment of adoption without it first having been determined that the parental rights
of the non-consenting parent can and should be terminated." Id. at 95, 293 A.2d at
174. The court noted that some decisions may have expressed or suggested that the
child's best interests were of paramount importance "without regard to whether parental obligations could be said to have been forsaken." Id. The court directed that
any of those suggestions or expressions are "disapproved." Id.
131 Id. at 97, 293 A.2d at 175. The court observed that "it is clear from the record
that he loves his children and that they are fond of him." Id. at 96-97, 293 A.2d at 174.
The birth father, as well as his parents, continued to visit the children until the birth
mother refused visitation without child support payments. Id. at 97, 293 A.2d at 174.
The birth father had just obtained employment and requested an additional six
months of visitation after which time "he would try to work out a support agreement."
Id., 293 A.2d at 174-75. The birth mother had already decided that she wanted her
new husband to adopt the children and refused the birth father's request; the adoption complaint was filed shortly thereafter. Id., 293 A.2d at 175. The birth father did
not want to aggravate the situation, so he stopped trying to see the children. Id. The
children were disappointed when his visits ceased. Id. The birth father offered to pay
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey has generally adhered to
this two-part test governing the approval of independent adoptions. 112 The first part of this test, regarding the termination of
$20 a week in child support, but his offer was refused. Id. The birth father deposited
that money in a bank account from that time forward. Id. At the adoption hearing,
the birth father "demonstrated that he had not used drugs since the commencement
of his [three year] incarceration" and that he was succeeding in his job, bringing
home a steady income. Id. The trial court granted the adoption over the birth father's objection, stating that the adoption was in the best interests of the children. Id.
at 91, 97, 293 A.2d at 172, 175.
The supreme court explained that a criminal record is not sufficient grounds for
terminating parental rights. Id. at97, 293 A.2d at 175. The court relied on the strong
evidence of the birth father's rehabilitation and evidence that he had not forsaken his
parental rights. Id. at 97-98, 293 A.2d at 175.
132 See supranotes 121-131 and infra notes 137-186 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the New Jersey Supreme Court has consistently applied the two-part test
in independent adoptions); but cf. Sorentino I and Sorentino HI,supra note 95 (establishing that the supreme court did not apply the two-part test in one agency adoption).
In some cases, the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services will bring a
case seeking guardianship of a child, generally so that the child may be placed for
adoption. The legal standard for terminating parental rights in those cases is not the
same as in independent adoptions. See New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v.
A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 604-11, 512 A.2d 438, 445-49 (1986) (establishing the test for termination of parental rights in guardianship cases). In A. W., the court established a
four-part test for determining whether to terminate parental rights. Id. The court
explained that, in a termination proceeding, the trial court must determine that "(1)
[T]he child's health and development have been or will be seriously impaired by the
parental relationship," id. at 604, 512 A.2d at 445, "(2) [t]he parents are unable or
unwilling to elimate the harm and delaying permanent placement will add to the
harm," id. at 605, 512 A.2d at 445, "(3) [tlhe court has considered alternatives to
termination," id. at 608, 512 A.2d at 447, and "(4) [t]he termination of parental rights
will not do more harm than good." Id. at 610, 512 A.2d at 448.
The A. W test was refined by the Supreme Court of NewJersey in In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 18, 608 A.2d 1312, 1320 (1992). JC.involved the bonding
between children and foster parents. Id. at 5, 608 A.2d at 1313. The issue was
"whether the parental rights of a natural mother should be terminated based on the
need to protect children from potential harm that may result from being separated
from foster parents with whom the children may have formed parental bonds." Id.
The J C. court refused to allow termination based solely upon bonding and directed
courts to view a child's relationship with his or her foster parent "not in isolation but
in a broader context that includes as well the quality of the child's relationship with
his or her natural parents." Id. at 18, 608 A.2d at 1320. The court emphasized that it
is not enough to show "that the child has a strong relationship with the foster parents
or might be better off if left in their custody." Id. at 19, 608 A.2d at 1320. The court
concluded that the Division of Youth and Family Services "must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that separating the child from his or her foster parents would
cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm." Id. (citing Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768 (1982)).
The level and effect of a child's bonding with his or her foster parent, therefore,
becomes only a part of the four part test to determine whether termination of parental rights is appropriate; it is not the only test. Id. The second factor of the A.W. test
requires a finding that "[t]he parents are unable or unwilling to elimate the harm ."
A.W, 103 N.J. at 605, 512 A.2d at 445 (emphasis added). This part of the test is
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parental rights, is governed by statute.1 3 3 Under current New
Jersey law, the court may terminate parental rights in an independent adoption if the birth parent fails to make a timely objection to
the adoption.134 If, however, the birth parent objects to the adoption, the statute permits the court to terminate the birth parent's
rights only in two situations: (1) when the birth parent is able to
perform parental functions and has failed to do so; or (2) when the
birth parent is unable to perform parental functions.1 3 5 Parental
functions include, but are not limited to, maintaining a relationship with the child so that the child perceives the birth parent as
his or her parent, communicating with and
visiting the child, and
1 36
providing financial support for the child.
Perhaps the most notable contested adoption case in New
Jersey was decided in 1977.137 In Sees v. Baber,"IS the birth mother
executed a consent to adoption when the child was three days old
and then surrendered the child to the prospective adoptive parents
in the hospital parking lot the following day.'3 9 Two days later, the
satisfied where the Division of Youth and Family Services establishes, by clear and
convincing evidence, that separation of the child and foster parent will "cause serious
and enduring emotional or psychological harm,"J C., 129 N.J. at 19, 608 A.2d at 1320
(citing Santosky, 455 U.S. at 768).
The A. W four-part test was recently codified by the New Jersey Legislature in N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-15.1 (West 1991).
133 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-48(c) (West 1993).
134 Id. § 9:3-48(c). The court may terminate the birth parents rights if, "upon completion of the preliminary hearing the court finds that: ... [t)he parents of the child
do not have rights as to custody of the child by reason of ... their failure to make
timely objection to the adoption." Id. § 9:3-48(c).
135 Id. The pertinent statute directs that:
[a] judgment of adoption shall not be entered over an objection of a
parent communicated to the court by personal appearance or by letter
unless the court finds: (1) that the parent has substantially failed to
perform the regular and expected parental functions of care and support of the child, although able to do so, or (2) that the parent is unable to perform the regular and expected parental functions of care
and support of the child and that the parent's inability to perform those
functions is unlikely to change in the immediate future.
Id. § 9:3-46(a).
136 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-46(a) (West 1993). There is a presumption that the parent
has "failed to perform the regular and expected parental functions of care and support if the court finds that the situation ... has occurred for six or more months." Id.
137 Sees v. Baber, 74 N.J. 201, 377 A.2d 628 (1977).
138 74 NJ. 201, 377 A.2d 628 (1977).
139 Id. at 206, 207, 377 A.2d at 631. The birth mother first considered agency adoption. Id. at 205-06, 377 A.2d at 630. Two days prior to giving birth, the birth mother
met with a physician, who suggested an independent adoption. Id. at 206, 377 A.2d at
631. When she gave birth, the birth mother was advised that she was not committed
to surrender the child and that she was also entitled to counseling. Id. The birth
mother executed a consent to adoption three days after the child's birth. Id. at 206,
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birth mother changed her mind and requested that the child be
returned to her.14 ° The prospective adoptive parents denied this
request and the birth mother sued for the immediate return of the
child. 141
The trial court denied the request, explaining that by consenting to the adoption and voluntarily surrendering her child, the
birth mother had forsaken her parental obligations and, thus, her
parental rights should be terminated. 14 2 Specifically, the trial court
found it relevant that the birth mother's decision was not one
made on the spur of the moment, was not a hurried, abrupt decision, and was not made under personal stress. 1 4 s Further, the trial
court observed, there was no evidence of coercion, fraud, overreaching, undue influence, or pressure." M The birth mother appealed the decision, but the appellate division affirmed the trial
court. 145

On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the
lower courts' rulings, applying the traditional two-part test and determining that the birth mother's parental rights could not be terminated. 146 The court explained that to terminate the birth
mother's parental rights, the birth mother must have willfully and
continuously neglected or failed to perform the natural, regular
obligations of support and care of her child. 14 7 Specifically, the
court continued, the birth mother's conduct must amount to intentional abandonment or substantial neglect of parental duties
and parental claims without a reasonable expectation of any rever148
sal in the near future.
The lower courts relied upon the birth mother's consent to
207, 377 A.2d at 631. The birth mother was not advised that, upon receipt of the
adoption pleadings, she had 20 days to contest the adoption or that she could change
her mind after executing the consent form. Id. at 207, 377 A.2d at 631. The next day,
the birth mother and the child were released from the hospital and the birth mother
surrendered the child to the prospective adoptive parents at that time. Id.
140 Id. The birth mother's mother immediately contacted the physician who had
arranged the independent adoption. Id. The prospective adoptive parents' attorney
was also notified that day. Id.
141 Id. at 208, 377 A.2d at 631.
142 Id., 377 A.2d at 632.
143 Sees, 74 N.J. at 208, 377 A.2d at 632.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 209, 210, 377 A.2d at 632, 633.
147 Id.. at 210, 377 A.2d at 633.
148 Id. at 210-11, 377 A.2d at 633 (quoting In reAdoption of Children by D., 61 NJ.
89, 94-95, 293 A.2d 171, 173 (1972)).
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the adoption and voluntary surrender of the child.1 49 In contrast,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that those actions alone
were insufficient grounds for terminating the birth mother's
rights. 5 ° The court explained that consent and voluntary surrender are only grounds for termination when the child is surrendered to an approved adoption agency.' 51 The court clearly
expressed that the decision not to terminate the birth mother's
rights in this case was based upon the fact that this was a nonagency adoption. 5 2 To terminate parental rights in an independent adoption, the court instructed, there must be significant additional conduct evidencing relinquishment or abandonment of
parental status. 5
The court indicated that such additional evidence exists where
the birth parent considered adoption for many months prior to the
child's birth, does not object to the adoption for many months following the surrender of the child, or does not object until receiving notice of the hearing on the adoption. 15 4 The court therefore
distinguished the 1974 case In re Adoption by RD. 1 55 In that case,
Id. at 216, 377 A.2d at 636.
Id. The court reviewed the legislative history concerning the effect of consent
and surrender in a termination proceeding. Id. at 211, 377 A.2d at 633. Previously,
the court noted, consent to adoption was statutory grounds for adoption. Id. The
court explained, however, that "consent was eliminated as an independent or alternative statutory basis for adoption, at least with respect to private or non-agency placements." Id. at 211-12, 377 A.2d at 634. The notion of abandonment "became an
equivalent or substitute for consent, embracing 'any conduct' reflecting 'a settled purpose' to repudiate parental status." Id. at 211, 377 A.2d at 633 (citing Wood v. Wood,
77 N.J. Eq. 593, 597, 77 A. 91, 93-94 (E. & A. 1910) and Winans v. Luppie, 47 N.J. Eq.
302, 305, 20 A. 969, 971 (E. & A. 1890)). The court asserted that the elimination of
consent as grounds for independent adoption resulted from the Legislature's desire
to protect parental rights. Id. at 212, 377 A.2d at 634.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 216, 377 A.2d at 636. The court commented that the decision to not
terminate the birth mother's parental rights was "buttressed by the important fact that
the adoption was attempted through an unsupervised and unregulated private placement of the child." Id. The court observed that "[t]he thrust of the legislative approach is to encourage adoptions through approved agencies," id. at 217, 377 A.2d at
636, because such agencies are "designed to protect natural parents from precipitous
decisions [and] . . . serve as well the interests of adoptive parents and the welfare of
the child." Id.
153 Sees, 74 N.J. at 213-14, 377 A.2d at 635.
154 Id. at 214-15, 377 A.2d at 635. The court provided specific examples of sufficient evidence, such as considering adoption for more than six months prior to a
child's birth, raising no objection until six months after a child's birth, failing to demand the return of the child until receiving notice of the preliminary hearing, or
failing to object until the actual hearing. Id.
155 Id. at 214, 377 A.2d at 635 (citing In re Adoption of a Child by R.D., 127 N.J.
Super. 311, 317 A.2d 383 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 65 NJ. 292, 321 A.2d 253 (1974)).
149
150
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the birth mother considered adoption for more than six months
prior to the child's birth and then raised no objection to the adoption until the formal adoption proceedings began, six months after
she surrendered the child.1 5 6 The court in Adoption by RD. was
justified in terminating the birth mother's parental rights, the Sees
court explained, because the birth mother's conduct
constituted
15 7
an intentional relinquishment of parental claims.
Further, the Sees court distinguished the 1963 case In re Adoption of D.,158 where the birth parents' rights were also terminated
over their objection.' 5 9 In Adoption of D., the birth parents considered adoption for several months prior to the child's birth and did
not object to the adoption until two months after the surrender of
the child.' 60 The Sees court expressed that such behavior was
grounds for terminating parental rights. 16 1
The Supreme Court of New Jersey most recently considered a
contested adoption in 1994 in In re Adoption by D.M.H. 6 2 In that
case, the birth mother made the decision to surrender her child
for adoption approximately one month prior to the child's
birth. 163 One year later, the birth mother objected to the adoption
156 Id.

157 Id. Although the Adoption by RD. court relied on the element of consent, the
Sees court asserted that there was significant additional evidence of abandonment or
relinquishment of parental rights to justify terminating those rights. Id.
158 Sees, 74 N.J. at 214, 377 A.2d at 635 (citing In re Adoption of D., 78 N.J. Super.
117, 187 A.2d 628 (1963)).
159 Id.

160 Id.

161 Id. While the Adoption of D. court emphasized the consent to adoption, the Sees
court reasoned that there was additional evidence of abandonment or relinquishment
of parental rights to justify the termination of those rights. Id.
162 135 NJ. 473, 641 A.2d 235 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 433 (1995).
165 Id. at 478, 641 A.2d at 237. The birth mother, Jeanne, was "twenty years old,
unmarried, and the mother of an infant boy," id. at 477, 641 A.2d at 237, when she
became pregnant in 1989. Id. Jeanne first considered abortion and then considered
giving the child up for adoption. Id. The prospective adoptive parents, Donna and
Steve, contacted Jeanne through a mutual acquaintance and began discussing adopting her unborn child. Id. at 477-78, 641 A.2d at 237. Jeanne finally decided to give
her child up for adoption very late in her pregnancy, but she stated that her decision
was not a snap decision and that she had enough time to think about it. Id. at 478,
641 A.2d at 237. Donna, Steve, and Jeanne agreed that Jeanne would receive pictures
of the child, would be able to visit the child, and "would be informed as to the child's
progress." Id. Jeanne gave birth to a healthy baby boy on July 22, 1990, and surrendered him to Donna and Steve on July 27, 1990. Id. On October 15, 1990, Jeanne
knowingly and voluntarily signed a form consenting to the adoption. Id. Jeanne
spoke to Donna and Steve approximately once a month after the surrender. Id. The
day before the child's first birthday, Jeanne saw the child for the first time since she
surrendered him. Id. at 479, 641 A.2d at 237.
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and filed a complaint for custody.'16 The trial court ruled that the
birth mother had intentionally abandoned the child, but refused
to terminate the birth mother's parental rights. 16 5 The court explained that it was reasonable to expect that the birth mother
would reverse her conduct and, thus, the court could not terminate her parental rights under the adoption statute.' 66 Although
the court denied the adoption, the court allowed the prospective
adoptive parents to retain custody, subject to visitation by the birth
mother. 167
The trial court's ruling was reversed on appeal.1 68 The appellate division found that the birth mother's intentional abandonment of the child was final and terminated the birth mother's
parental rights.' 69 The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the
appellate division's ruling.1 70 The supreme court emphasized the
strength of the parent-child relationship and the constitutional
17
protection afforded that relationship. '
The court found that the mother's conduct constituted intentional abandonment, a necessary finding under the statute in effect
at that time. 172 The court explained that "intentional abandonment" exists where a birth parent has willfully forsaken his or her
obligations, despite being physically and financially able to meet

164 Id., 641 A.2d at 238. Jeanne wrote a letter objecting to the adoption on July 16,
1991. Id., 641 A.2d at 237. On July 22, 1991, Jeanne filed a complaint for custody.
Id., 641 A.2d at 238. Jeanne alleged that she wanted the child back as early as four
months after the surrender. Id. Jeanne claims that she did not say anything because
she was afraid that, if she did, Donna and Steve would not let her see the child. Id.
165 Id. at 480, 641 A.2d at 238.
166 Id. The trial court explained that state statute provided "for the reversal of conduct demonstrating intentional abandonment." Id. at 480, 641 A.2d at 238 (citing
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-48(c)(1) (West 1993)).
167 D.M.H., 135 N.J. at 480, 377 A.2d at 238.
168 Id.
169 Id. The appellate division did not interpret the statute "to permit the reversal of
conduct constituting intentional abandonment." Id. The appellate division held that
the intentional abandonment was final. Id.
170 Id. at 495, 641 A.2d at 246. The supreme court terminated visitation byJeanne
pending appeal. Id.
171 Id. at 480, 641 A.2d at 238. The supreme court explained that extraordinarily
strong protections surround parental rights. Id. The supreme court noted that
"[t]he right of a biological parent to enjoy a relationship with his or her child is
fundamental and constitutionally protected." Id. (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 651 (1972) and In reAdoption of Children by L.A.S., 134 N.J. 127, 132, 631 A.2d
928, 930 (1993)).
172 Id. at 481, 485, 641 A.2d at 238-39, 241 (citing NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-48(c) (1)
(West 1993)).
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those obligations. 173 While the term "intentional abandonment" is
no longer in the New Jersey statute, the current standard is essentially unchanged.17 4 The termination of parental rights today requires a finding that the birth parent is able to perform parental
1 75
functions and has failed to do so.
The D.M.H. court articulated a variety of factors to be evaluated when considering termination of parental rights. 176 First, the
court identified surrender of the child and consent to the adoption
as salient factors.1 77 Further, the court found that the nature of the
decision to surrender the child is important. 178 Specifically, the
court explained, the decision must be deliberative, 179
informed, and
voluntary to permit termination of parental rights.
The court cautioned, however, that in an independent adoption, surrender and consent are not determinative. 18 0 Citing Sees v.
Baber, the court instructed that a birth parent can have a change of
mind, within a reasonable time, that may prohibit the termination
of his or her parental rights. 81 The court enumerated additional
factors for consideration, where the birth parent has changed his
173 D.M.H., 135 N.J. at 481, 641 A.2d at 239 (quoting L.A.S., 134 N.J. at 134-35, 631
A.2d at 932).
174 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-48(c)(1) (West 1993). The D.M.H. court observed that
abandonment exists when "a parent has willfully forsaken obligations, although physically and financially able to discharge those obligations." D.M.H., 135 N.J. at 481, 641
A.2d at 239 (quoting L.A.S., 134 N.J. at 134-135, 631 A.2d at 932). Similarly, the current statute provides for termination upon a showing that the parent has substantially
failed "to perform the regular and expected parental functions of care and support of
the child, although able to do so." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-48(c) (1).
175 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-48(c) (1).
176 D.M.H., 135 N.J. at 482-83, 641 A.2d at 239-40.
177 Id.. at 482, 641 A.2d at 239.
178 Id.
179 Id. (citing In reAdoption of One Child by R.A.C., 154 N.J. Super. 513, 518, 381
A.2d 1232, 1234 (App. Div. 1977), certif denied, 75 NJ. 607, 384 A.2d 837 (1978) and
In reAdoption of a Child by R.D., 127 N.J. Super. 311, 319, 317 A.2d 382, 386 (App.
Div.), certif. denied, 65 N.J. 292, 321 A.2d 253 (1974)). For example, the court observed that such decisions should not be made on the "spur-of-the-moment" and
should be considered for several months prior to the birth of the child. Id.
180 Id. at 483, 641 A.2d at 239 (citing In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 433-34, 537 A.2d
1227, 1246 (1988)).
181 D.M.H., 135 N.J. at 483, 641 A.2d at 239-40 (citing Sees v. Baber, 74 N.J. 201,
208, 377 A.2d 628, 632 (1977)). The court cautioned that this change of mind must
"occur within a reasonable period of time after the surrender of the child for adoption." Id., 641 A.2d at 239. The court observed that parental rights have not been
terminated when the, change of mind occurred two days after surrender and that
parental rights have been terminated when the change of mind occurred four to six
months after the surrender. Id., 641 A.2d at 239-40 (citing Sees, 74 N.J. at 215, 377
A.2d at 635, Adoption by RD., 127 N.J. Super. at 318, 317 A.2d at 385, and In reAdoption of One Child by R.A.C., 154 N.J. Super. 513, 518, 381 A.2d 1232, 1235 (App. Div.
1977), certif[ denied, 75 N.J. 607, 384 A.2d 837 (1978)).
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or her mind."8 2 The court stated that it is relevant to consider
whether the birth parent communicated his or her change of mind
to the adoptive parents.1 8 3 Further, the court directed that the
birth parents' prompt and diligent action to procure the return of
their child is a necessary consideration."8 4
The court held that it was appropriate to terminate the birth
mother's parental rights in this case."8 5 The court reasoned that
the birth mother voluntarily surrendered her child, consented to
the adoption, and failed to withdraw1 86her consent immediately,
promptly, or within a reasonable time.
Contested independent adoptions in New Jersey have been
subject to settled guidelines and standards that make it clear that
prospective adoptive parents should be wary of involvement in an
independent adoption and that birth parents should know their
rights. First and foremost, prospective adoptive parents need to be
aware that the birth parents have the legal right to change their
mind, even following the birth and surrender of the child. Second,
birth parents need to make their decisions with the knowledge that
there is only a short time for any doubts to surface; those doubts
182

Id. at 482, 641 A.2d at 239.

183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 485, 641 A.2d at 241. The court concluded that the record fully supported
the trial court's determination that Jeanne intentionally abandoned the child. Id.
The supreme court observed that Jeanne's surrender and consent were deliberative
and informed, not the result of a snap decision. Id. at 483, 641 A.2d at 240. The
court further noted that Jeanne knowingly signed the consent form three months
after the surrender of the child. Id. at 483-84, 641 A.2d at 240. Additionally, the court
observed that Jeanne's surrender and consent were voluntary; there was no evidence
that she was financially or physically unable to meet her parental responsibilities. Id.
at 484, 641 A.2d at 240. Also, the court commented thatJeanne did not take prompt,
diligent steps to regain custody of her child: she did not attempt to exercise parental
functions and did not request the return of the child until one year after the surrender. Id. The court remarked that Donna and Steve relied upon Jeanne's decision to
surrender her child and her consent to the child's adoption. Id. The court mentioned that the child had bonded with Donna and Steve, but apparently the court did
not rely on that bonding in deciding to terminate Jeanne's parental rights. Id. at 485,
641 A.2d at 241.
186 D.M.H., 135 N.J. at 485, 641 A.2d at 241. The court further considered whether
Jeanne's intentional abandonment could be "reversed" as suggested by the trial court.
Id. The supreme court rejected the appellate division's suggestion that
"[a]bandonment is abandonment... [and is] a terminal act not subject to reasonable
expectation of reversal." Id. at 486, 641 A.2d at 241. The supreme court reasoned
that a person's conduct may change over time. Id. at 487, 641 A.2d at 241. The court
maintained that those "obligations encompass the performance of the regular and
expected functions of care and support of the child." Id. at 488, 641 A.2d at 242. In
this case, the court concluded, Jeanne's "actions failed to overcome the conduct that
amounted to the intentional repudiation of her parental obligations." Id.
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must be resolved immediately or their parental rights are in serious
jeopardy. Finally, the judicial system must find a way to deal with
contested adoptions on an emergent or expeditious basis. Regardless of how established the law may be, the emotional well-being of
a child is not served when the appeal process can last years.
CONCLUSION

When one compares the sparsity of litigation arising from
agency adoptions with the volume and length of litigation arising
from independent adoptions, it is easy to draw the conclusion that
independent adoptions are not in anyone's best interests. 187 Finding solutions, however, is a much more difficult task. If adoption is
viewed as a process through which childless parents can obtain a
child, independent adoption has distinct advantages: shorter waiting periods; immediate placement of the child in the prospective
adoptive home; no risk of discrimination by an agency; and a more
open adoption. 18 8 If, however, adoption is seen as the process
through which society provides homes for parentless children, the
independent adoption loses its appeal.1 8 9 The risks of lengthy litigation, great expense, and black or "grey" market babies cannot be
in the best interests of any child.19 °
Many of the criticisms of agency adoption are valid, such as
long waiting periods, potential discrimination, and temporary foster placement. 9 1 Perhaps the solution lies not with alternative
methods of adoption, such as independent adoption, but with
changes to the agency system. For example, the agencies could
pre-approve prospective adoptive parents and avoid placing children in foster care. Also, the agencies could offer birth parents
some input in the selection of adoptive parents, thus allowing the
more open adoption often preferred by birth parents.1 92 The
187 Hansen, supra note 2, at 58 (listing several contested independent adoption
cases); see supra notes 80-186 and accompanying text (reviewing contested independent adoptions).
188 Emery, supra note 36, at 144 (asserting that "adoption is a service to the child
and that the goal of adoption is to find parents for children, not children for parents"); see supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text (discussing the advantages of
independent adoption).
189 See supra notes 69-92 and accompanying text (analyzing the disadvantages of
independent adoption).
190 See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text (reviewing the disadvantages of
agency adoption).

191 Id.
192 McDermott, supra note 8, at 147 (including the birth parents' desire to select
adoptive parents as one of the reasons for selecting independent adoption over
agency adoption).
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lengthy wait is an inevitable obstacle when the demand for children exceeds the supply. 9 ' This obstacle should not justify the inherent risks of independent adoption.
Solutions do not come easily when an issue is as fraught with
emotion as this one is. Presently, however, people are able to transfer custody of children in a significantly unregulated manner.'9 4
The legal and emotional battles that have followed are a call for
change. The sooner that change occurs, the better for the future
of children and parents in our society.
Susan A. Munson

193 See supra note 16-17 (referring to the low supply of and high demand for
healthy, adoptable infants).
194 NewJersey law only regulates an independent adoption after the child has been
surrendered. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-48 (West 1993). The prospective adoptive parents
are given 45 days to file the complaint for adoption. Id. § 9:3-44. It is upon receipt of
this complaint that the court appoints an agency to investigate the circumstances surrounding the surrender, including any money or valuable consideration exchanged.
Id. § 9:3-48(a).

